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e evolution of p ever more flexible and ~i~eteeRth centu~ by can be seen as an elaboration of data structufe3. first one had the integers, then the rationals, the algebraic numbers, afket some st and complex numbers, the general concept of function, etc. At last it was that set theory could serve as a universal Iangua~e, in which all the ry data StNCtUfCS could be constNded from the primitive data structure, set. perhaps computer science could take advanrage o iminafy investigation into what a be like. On the other hand, in babe dtfintd functions by identifying them with the sets which are their graphs. Rigor is identified with set theory, so the definition of a function a rule has to 80. This is particularly inappropriate for computer science, and even many mathematicians are more interested than before in rub for eonrputiq tbt solutions or" problems. We shall resuffuct functions-rules and five thtm fht place in M theory fhaf they deserve. Thus this pet can also be viewed an investigation in the foundations of hematics. n order to be mmipalafd by a compufer, a set mua# be repmeafcd by a concrttt objtu, ultimately by a sequence of zeroes and ones. Thar does sot mean, however, can be manipulafed. For example, the data type 6&tum of of arbitrary size is common; we shall dtn4Ht if mofe simply tin# an infinite set by a (finite) name, in thii perty enabling us to compurt membetship in fht stf.
in cummon use is adtqurft fo fht dtmands 2). making Ihe same poina uses "pid#n Pucrl" a112 algorithm extracted from Bishop*& constructive proof of the Weiemtrass r the modulus of continuify of X a third qumenl 6 of tolerance of approximaGon, and outputs a polynomial, ucnce of reals (of unknown ltn#h). Thlr trrunplt for more gtntd typing facili&s. Althou@ many e#ofts wn
Thii problem would
down an axiomatic set theory simlar to that in use today. The operation by which this set is produced from a is a first-rate example of a legitimate operation on sets; there should be an operation c+ such that c+(a) = {x E a : d(x)}.
ursion. The operators we have been discussing are in general partially defined, and should satisfy the recursion theorem, according to which for each operation g there is an operation $ such f(x) f= g(~$ fi., But as it turns out, these three principles taken together are contradictory:
2.4.
eorem (Gordeev) . Extensionality, the recursion theorem, and the existence of an operation q, corresponding to separation are contradictory.
roof. Let g( z, f) = {x E (0) : f (z) = x}, by separation, where $9 is the empty set.
Introduce f by the recursion theorem so that f(z) = g( zJ). Since g is total, so is f; but then f(f) is a set, namely f(f)={xE{PJ}:f(f)=x}.
If f(f)=@, then @of, contradiction, so f ( f) # 0. But if x E f (f), then x = $3 and x = f (f), contradiction. Hence f(f) has no members. By extensionality then f(f) = 0, cpntradiction. Cl
This theorem was first discovered in connection with theories of sets and rules developed by Feferman [ 141, in which extensionality is not an axiom. It was therefore not regarded as a paradox, but simply as a refutation of extensionality in the context of those theories. In the present context, however, Gordeev's theorem does seem paradoxical at first, and it prompts a closer examination of the foundational viewpoint which must underlie the theories we intend to construct.
ules and sets: reflections on the foundations of mathematics
In mathematics we find two kinds of "mathematical entities": the concrete and the abstract. By concrete entities we mean objects which can be completely represented by a finite sequence of symbols, capable of being stored in a computer (although no fixed bound on the size of concrete objects is imagined). By an abstract entity, on the other hand, we mean an object which by its nature is infinite and can never be completely displayed. An abstract entity may however be represented in various ways; the example has already been discussed. A discovery of the early axiomatizers of set theory was that concrete entities can be represented or "coded" by suitable sets, so that from a formal point of view we may pretend that "everything is a set". The resulting axiomatizations have an appealing simplicity, and no doubt it was partly due to this simplicity that set theory came to be regarded as a "universal language" for mathematics, a status which it enjoys to this day. Only certain dissenters from the mainstream of mathematics have resisted the doctrine that "everything is a set". We have in mind various schools of constructive thought, such as the intuitionists (followers of Brouwer); the Russian constructivists (following Markov), who reject all abstract objects out of hand and work only with symbolic representations; and more recently those working in the style of Bishop [S] , who accepte a notion of sets as abstract objects.
All of these schools regard the notion of rule or law as fundamental. for Brouwer, "eine Menge ist ein Gesetz" (a set is a law). It is also interesting that if we go back to the period before Zermelo's axiomatization, the concept of '"law" plays a role. For example, the notion of "transformation" (Abbildung) plays an important role in Dedekind's Was sind uns was sollen die Zahlen: he takes "transfermations" as laws that transform elements s of a set S to "determinate things" 4(s). He then anticipates Fraenkel's principle of "replacement" by stating that the image f$( S) of a set S is again a set.
The distinction made above between abstract and concrete entities opens the way for another important distinction, that between rule and algorithm. An algorithm operates on concrete objects and produces (if anything) concrete objects. A rule, on the other hand, may operate on and produce either concrete or abstract objects. For example, there is an o eration M such that U(X) is the set known as the union of x, usually written U x, hose members are the members of the members of x. The rule u is not representable in set theory in its usual formulation: it is not a set, nor is its graph a set. It is a rule. Another example is the powerset operation 9.
One thesis of this paper is that rules as fundamental to mathematics and computer science as sets are. For example, the concept of "'function" has its roots in the idea that "a function is a rule". The gradual development of that idea into the definition of a function as a single-valued set took a long time (see [36] ), and perhaps ought to be reconsidered for the foundations of computer science. Even in mathematics the idea of "function-as-a-rule" retains a certain appeal, and the definition of "function-as-a-set" is usually justified when first presented by reference to the intuitive concept of a rule, which shows that the concept of a rule is actually more fundamental.
Rules are supposed to be concrete objects, given by symbolic representations. A question now arises: how does a rule operate on a set, which is an abstract object? The operation u, for example, is supposed to operate on any set, not just on sets which happen to have symbolic representations. There are various algorithms corresponding to u, which enable US to compute symbolic representations of U x fro specified kinds of symbolic replaesentations of X, but these algorithms are not to be identified with the opeation u itself. We shall have to take the application operation as primitive. When we give a rule, we must tell how to apply it, i.e., what the answer is at a given argument. We may also define algorithms operating on symbolic representations of sets. It may happen that such an algorithm is extensional, in the ~:e nse that it takes all representations of any given set x onto representations of the same set. In that case, the algorithm can be counted as a rule, although it would be defined only in those sets that have a symbolic representation of the kind involved in the definition of the algorithm. There may also be algorithms which are not extensional; for example, if sets are represented by listing their members, then the function which picks the first element of a list will not be extensional.
With these distinctions in hand, we can "resolve" the paradox posed by Gordeev's theorem. The proof constitutes the construction 06c a particular algorithm which is demonstrably nonextensional. The author does not consider this "resolution" any more definitive than the so-called resolutions of the paradoxes of classical set theory. we shall proceed by retreating to axioms which block the contradiction, yet are useful for practical purposes.
The main idea is to restrict the separation axiom to formulae 4 of ordinary set theory, i.e., formulae which do not involve the application relation. This turns out not to be very restrictive; in practice, we can often define sets that we need (including the dependence on parameters), even when the definition appears to require separation for a formula involving the application of operations. The method is a process of substitution.
For example, suppose we want to define g(x, b) = {u: 3x E b( u Ed)}.
Th ere will be a certain operation c,,, such that C~ (4 w) = {XE Q: XE w}. Then g(x, b) = c4(u(im(b,j')),f(x)), where as above u is union and (b,f) is the image of & under J It is instructive to see why this method does not permit us to define the set used in Gordeev's proof. Try h(z, y) = {x E (46): y = x} and g(z,f) = h(z, f (2)). But now, although h is total, there is no reason why g is total, and the argument in Gordeev's proof only shows that f(f) is undefined.
To avoid any confusion, one point should be reiterated. Gordeev's theorem does not show the inconsistency of extensionality, the recursion theorem, and separation. Rather, it shows the inconsistency of extensionality, the recursion theorem, and the dependence on parameters by a rule of sets defined by separation. elated work Zermelo [40] formulated axioms for set theory which form the basis of modern set theory. Zermelo said that he was motivated by "set theory as it is historically given". That is, he cttempted to write down axioms which accounted for mathematical practice, and which he believed to be free of paradoxes. Let us call tLis the "pragmatic" approach to axiomatization, as opposed to the "philosophical" approach in which one attempts to justify one's axioms. The philosophical approach was taken by Cantor and Dedekind (see the Appendix of this paper), but Zermelo's main motivation was to convince people that he had really proved that the reals could be well-ordered, which accounts for his pragmatism.
Von Neumann [38] showed that one could take the concept "function" as primitive instead of "set", and define "set" in terms of "function". This was, however, a theory of functions, not a theory of rules; no computability was implied.
ishop [S] viewed mathematics as a "high-level programming language". In his e made no attempt to formalize that programming language, although in unpublished work he did so. is formalization remained unpublished, because his theory contained a paradox. Martin-L6f [33, 34] introduced "type theories", in which one forms types which are similar to (but not as general as) sets. In the most recent version of these theories, Martin-L6f has explicitly forbidden the formation of types of types9 but allows only the formation of types of names oftypes, espousing the principle that one may form types only of concrete objects. Martin-Liif's approach is philosophical as opposed to pragmatic; he views his formal theories as an incomplete description. He clearly believes he has replaced Cantor's definition of a set with one which (if not equally simple) is at least correct, and hence does not lead to paradoxes. (It is interesting to note, however, that the earliest version of his theory was also inconsistent.) A group in Giiteborg has implemented a system based on Martin-L6f's theories on the computer; it is called "Gsteborg LCF".
Feferman [ 14, IS] introduced theories of operations and classes. These are based on a philosophy that the "universe" V consists of objects representable by finite symbolic expressions. One may form sets or "classes" of these objects. The objects include names or representations of the classes. If we understand Feferman's viewpoint correctly, one is never forming sets of abstract entities; for example, one never forms sets of sets. Instead, one forms sets of concrete representations of sets. This viewpoint justifies Feferman's "elementary comprehension axiom" that permits the formation of a universe V of all objects. The Russell paradox is blocked by the syntactic restriction to "elementary" formulae in the comprehension axiom. Hayashi [27] has implemented a version of Feferman's theory in LISP, in a program called PX. His theory replaces the combinators in Feferman's theory by the primitives of LISP.
Myhill [42] and Friedman [ 19,201 introduced theories in the language of classical set theory, but with intuitionistic logic. These theories, because of their intuitionistic logic, are indirectly connected to rules.
Graves [22] designed and implemented a theory of types based on category theory, more specifically on topos theory. Gordon, Milner, and Wadsworth [24] describe a system with rather general typing facilities known as "Edinburgh LCF", for which a denotational semantics based on the Scott-Strachey formalism has been given. Constable 193 has (with others) developed a system called NuPrl (two of whose predecessors are described in [ 10,111). These systems include proof-checkers operating in a typed, functional environment, whose theoretical basis belongs to the lineage of Martin-Liif's theories.
Belonging to the same lineage are at least three typed, fully functional programlanguages. (This phrase means that procedures are data objects with types.) are ML, Pebble, and QJ. ML was originally developed as a "metalanguage" for LCF, which accounts for its name; its structure makes it appropriate that these are also Martin-Liif's initials. Pebble, which is being developed at and Lampson [S] , permits types as values and allows some rat constructions; in particular bindings of variables are ordinary dat created by Sato as a uniform environment for the specification, execution. and verification of programs. The system Algos mentioned above is similar, but its lineage is category theory.
After this summary, we shall attempt to place the present work in context. There were three lines of development of theoretical, logical systems for constructive mathematics in the seventies: Martin-LX's type theories, Feferman's not-strictlytyped theorips, and Friedman-Myhill% constructive set theories. Each of these is capable of being implemented as a programming language with sufficient power to formalize mathematics in an interactive proof-checking environment. This line of research is well-developed for Martin-L6f's type theories, being developed for Feferman's theories by Hayashi, and so far untouched for the constructive set theories. As they stand, the constructive set theories are too crude since they do not allow a direct treatment of functional application. In this paper we correct this defect, creating constructive set theories suitable for computerization.
Preliminary description of ZFR
We shall formulate a theory ZFR, the letters stand for "Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Rules". This section describes the thecry; the next section gives a list of its axioms for reference.
In formulating theories of sets and rules, the first matter requiring attention is the choice of language. In classical Zermeio-Fraenkel set theory ZF, the assumption is made at the outset that every mathematical object is a set. This assumption is actually false: the integers are not sets (New Math to the contrary). Formally speaking, the Von Neumann integers-that is, the sets generated from the empty by the operation x u {x)-are isomorphic to the integers, and can serve as representatives of the integers. But to see that this is harmless, we must work outside the conceptual framework of ZF. Our present object is to formulate theories which more naturally reflect our intuitive views about the foundations of mathematics; hence, we do not wish to begin by assuming everything is a set. Moreover, we wish to leave the way open for computer-oriented versions of the theory in which there may be other "atomic" data types such as, for example, the symbolic atoms of LISP.
We therefore include unary predicates "S(x)" and "N(x)" for "x is a set" and "x is a nonnegative integer" respectively. It will not be necessary to include a predicate for "x is a rule". We shall not put into our theory any axioms restricting the kinds of objects there are, such as "everything is either an integer or a set". As a matter of convenience, we shall use the letters a, b, u, 0, w (with or without subscripts) for sets, and i, j, k, rr, m for integers. By this we mean that variables denoted by these metavariables are implicitly restricted to the unary predicates S and N. There will be a binary relation "E" for membership.
We shall need a means of speaking of the application of a rule to an object. There are two ways to proceed: (i) We can introduce a 3-ary relation Ap (A x, y) for: the result of applying f to x is y.
(ii) We can introduce a function symbol Ap so that Ap(_f, x) is the result of applying f to x. Approach (ii) seems more natural, but it necessitates a reformulation of logic since Ap(J; x) will sometimes be undefined. One suitable reformulation of logic has been given in 131, where it is called EPT (18gic of partial terms). There it is explained how to interpret a thefjry formulated in LPT into a theory formulated in style (i) above, with a 3-ary App relation. We shall formulate our theories in LIT. In practice, we shall write fx, f(x), or (fx) instead of Ap(f, x), We follow the conventions of combinatory logic: xyz abbreviates (xy )z (association to the left), and f(x, y) abbreviates fxy.
Logic of partial terms
The following description of LPI' is reproduced from [3] , where further details may be found. LPT is a logic in the same sense as the predicate calculus. If we are given any collection of predicate symbols, function symbols, and constants as in the usual predicate calculus, there will be a language in L based on these symbols. The rules for forming terms are the same as in ordinary predicate calculus. Every atomic formula in the usual sense is still an atomic formula; but there is one more kind of atomic formula, namely: if t is a term, then tJ is an atomic formula. This may be read "t is defined". It should be emphasized, however, that the intended meaning is that the term "t" denotes something. That is, one says of an object that it exists, of a term that it denotes or is defined. All objects exist, of course, so to say that something does not exist is a figure of speech; what is meant is that the term one has mentioned does not denote.
In case equality is part of the language, we use t = s to abbreviate (& + t = S) A (s& + t = s). In words: if either t or s denotes anything, then they both denote the same thine. Note, however, that = is not an official part of the language. With a suitable logic at hand, we are now in a position to set down some axioms about rules. Before doing this, we have to choose a suitable language in which to express our rules. The proliferation of modern programming languages illustrates the range of possibilities here. Since our present purpose is primarily theoretical, as opposed to being aimed at a practicai implementation, it will be wise to choose the simplest possible language, even if that makes it difficult in practice to write down specific rules. We therefore choose the language of combinatory logic, which is the simplest programming language in the world. Our theory will include two constants k and s, with the axioms These axioms permit the proof of the recursion theorem, according to which we can find, given g, an f such that fx = g(x, f ). In addition, they permit the construction of A-terms: if t is any term, then there is another term Ax. t such that (Ax. t)x s t (where x is a variable). Note that this is not a term-formation rule but a theorem. See [2, 12, 15] for details of these results.
The remaining axioms about rules concern the existence of a certain specific rules. First of all, there is a constant sN for the successor function on the integers. Second, there are several axioms corresponding to the set-theoretic axioms of pairing, separation, union, and powerset, which introduce constants as follows; p(x, y ) is the unordered pair of x and y; IL~X is the union of x; Px is the powerset of x, and e formulation of the replacement axiom in our theory is simply that the image et a under an operati n f such that f( defined for all x E a is a set im(a, f ).
is itself a mathematical object.
is is evidently what we try to express in much less natural language in the usual formulation of the replacement axiom, ) VxE a3!y&(x, y) + 3WxE a3ye bf$(x, y).
Moreover, this version of the axiom is not self-evident; the version about i self-evident version. can be derived from the axiom about ii using a &table version of the axiom hoice, but then one has to justify that if one can. The other two set-theoretical axioms, extensionality and E-induction, are not about rules at all, but about the nature of sets.
The constants c+ are included only for formulae 4 which do not contain do not contain any constants c clr ; this restriction will enable us to block the paradox discussed above.
6, Formal specification of ZF
It is natural to use intuitionistic logic when contemplating a computation system; but ZFR makes sense with or without the law of the excluded middle. To fix the notation, we shall use ZFR for the version with classical (ordinary) logic, a for the version with intuitionistic logic. Since ZFR can be obtained from adding the law of the excluded middle, we specify IZ Language of IZFR. Unary predicate symbols S and N for sets and numbers. Binary relation symbols E and =. Function symbol Ap. Constants A, k, s, sN, 0,0, 9, d, N, im, c4 for each primitive formula 4; the concept "primitive formula" is defined next.
Primitive formula. One not containing Ap or any constant cdi.
Logic of IZFR. L as specified above, with intuitionistic logic and equality axioms. Conventions. a, b, u, 0, w are (meta)variables for sets; i, j, k, n, m are for numbers. These conventions have been used to abbreviate the axioms. Other variables such as X, y, z are unrestricted.
Axioms of I (Al )
Remark. Note that the pairing axiom permits us to form a set gxy, usually written {x, y}, from any two objects x and y, not only from two sets.
Axioms of set theory
In this section we list for reference the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. These axioms are formulated in a language with binary relation symbols E and =, and no other constants, relation, or function symbols. Extensionality : Vx(xEa-xEb)+a=b. Pairing : 3a(xEahyEa). Union : 3aVx(xE aG3bE a(xE 6)). Separation :
3aVx(x E a -x E b A 4) (a not free in 4). Infinity : 3a(3x E a A Vx E a3y E a(x E y)). Powerset: 3a(Vz(zEx+zEb)+xEa). E -induction :
Empty set: 3aVx(x e a). Replacement : VxEa3!y+3bVx~a3y&+. Collection : Vx~a3y+4bVx~a3y~h$. These are the versions of the axioms which Friedman [ 181 discovered were suitable for use with intuitionistic logic; note that they are the same as the usual axioms except that the axiom of foundation has been replaced by E-induction. Also, the axioms of replacement and collection are equivalent if classical logic is allowed, but not with intuitionistic logic [2!1] . We therefore have the following set theories:
: all of the above axioms except collection, with intuitionistic logic, _.
CO]: all of the above axioms, with intuitionistic logic, all of the above axioms, with classical logic. Of course, collection implies replacement, so there is no need to include replacement on the list of axioms of This paper can be understoo wing anything about intuitionistic logic, but it is intuitionistic logic that would be built into a computation system based on and so a background in intuitionistic set theory is relevant. See [4, Chapter
Functions versus operations
By a "function", or sometimes for emphasis a "set-theoretic function", we mean as usual a single-valued set:
Note that although ordered pairs may be defined using the operation symbols of ZFR, the formula Funct is intended to abbreviate the usual formula of ZF which does not mention Ap.
The author has discussed the differences between functions and operations before; see, e.g., [4, pp. 40-421. There the case is given for making a careful distinction. Nevertheless, one may consider the axiom asserting that every function is an operation:
Here we have written Ap(f, x) = y instead off(x) = y to avoid any possible confusion about what is meant. FO (which stands for "functions are operations") is a rather strong statement in that it requires that the domain of the operation be the same as the domain of the function. Under Church's thesis the domains of operations should be r.e., while domains of functions could be arbitrary sets. If we use classical logic, then FO conflicts with Church's thesis for a more fundamental reason, namely that there will be lots of nonrecursive set-theoretic functions. To put the matter in the language of computer science: FO may be appropriate for denotational semantics, but not for operational semantics.
One may say that acceptance of FO is a major point distinguishing classical mathematics from constructive. It is not the only one, however, since imply the law of the excluded middle. One might say instead that it is point distinguishing the classical viewpoint from the computational viewpoint. A function, in the classical sense, need not be computable ; but an operation must be computable.
That viewpoint leads naturally enough to the desire '3 be able to form the set op(a, 6) of all operations from Q to 6. Indeed, the designers of programming languages want to have a type A+ B, and both Feferman and Martin-LX have incorporated such a cons tion in their theories. One cannot, however, prove the existence of op(a, 6) in Z Indeed, op(A, B) may contain aisitrarily complicated procedures. For example, given any set cy, one can construct a procedure leading from A to B which, although it incorporates a (in its "code", so to speak), simply ignores a! when it runs, and produces a constant value. Such procedures will have arbitrary rank, and so, in a theory in which sets must be well-founded, one cannot collect them all into a set.
Reflection will convince one that the exist do not even know if it is consistent with (a, b) is too much to as (a, &) is surely not what the computer scientists mean when they talk about the type a + b. What one wants of A + B is not that it contains all operations from A to B, but that there be an opera&m A(a) which "abstracts" from the definition of an operation f and a set Q to another operation A (a, f), such that A (u, f)x = fx for x E A. Usually we write A (a, j')x as Ax E a. fx. We now formulate a sensible axiom of exponentiation: This version of exponentiation is consistent with ZFR. In fact, it is implied by the principle FO discussed above. A natural candidate for A is the "graph'" operation Gr which associates to every set a and operation f the graph off on cr;: raamely {(x, fx): x E a}. The operation Gr is easily defined in terms of im;
If one assumes FO, then the set of graphs of operations from a to b coincides with the set of single-valued subsets of a x b, which can be formed by powerset and separation.
Strictly speaking, we cannot say that FO implies the axiom of exponentiation since that axiom involves a new symbol A. What we can prove can be precisely stated as follows. roof. We havti to tell how to interpret the two operations involved in Exg, namely A and the operation + involved in forming a + b. The interpretation of A is Gr, and the interpretation of -, is given by is used in verifying the second part of Exp under this interpretation, namely that every member of a + b is an operation from a to b. Cl
Lemma. IZFR + FO + Exp

onsistency of
In this section we prove that is consistent. In essence we onstruct a model he idea for the const n goes back to Feferman [5. 1: where models constructed for the combinatory axioms whose universe is a model to set theory and in which some prespecified functions + M are representable. The idea is to assign some members of to serve as dices for the prespecified functions, 3 Feferman's construction, in turn, can be traced back through [37] to its ultimate roots in Kleene [30] , where an inductive definition of an appplication relation is a key point of the theory.
Towards a computation system based on set theoy 31i
and define the application relation App on inductively, making x be some trivial function such as (1, x) and Kay be y at the basis stage, along with making the co&s of the prespecified functions behave as desired. We also make sx and SXJP equal to some trivial values. Then at the inductive stages, suppose we have already put XY = u and xz = t, and uv = w. Then we put sxyz = w. This inductive definition will close nd produce a model of the combinatory axioms. lies immediately to produce a model of some of the axioms of ZFR since we can take union, pairing, powerset as prespecified functions, as well as the operations c+ connected with separation (since the application relation is not mentioned in 4). However, the operation im cannot be prespecified since it depends on the application relation. Evidently, we cannot define im( a, f) until we have defined f(x) for all x E Q. This means that our inductive definition may not close off at any stage represented by an ordinal of A4 On the other hand, the application relation we are defining has to be definable in M if the axioms of set theory (in particular induction) are to be valid.
Nevertheless, if one pushes ahead with the plan of extending Feferman's construction to the transfinite, it turns out to work. What follows are just the details of this construction. Rather than present it model-theoretically, we prefer to define an interpretation from IZFR into IZF, in order to determine an upper bound for the proof-theoretic strength of IZFR as well a ve its consistency. Of tours follows from such an interpretation that Z n be interpreted in classical and hence is consistent.
It turns out to be just as easy to make the model satisfy the axiom F in the previous section; this shows that our model is far from an "operational semantics" of IZFR, in that (if interpreted classically) it will include nonrecursive operations. By Lemma 8.1, this will automatically result in a model which also satisfies the axiom of exponentiation.
Before beginning the proof, we need some techni 1 preparations. First, we describe a theory IZFR*, which is a version of IZF formulated with. a 3-ary predicate App instead of using the logic of partial terms. The passage from I to IZFR* is a special case of the general method of Beeson [3] for interpreting any theory in E into the first-order predicate calculus; the method associates to every function symbol f of a theory in bol for the graph of the function.
Here we take f to be A
We then have the axiom
Each of the axioms of * is the nAtural translation of the corres For instance, for pair@; :dlr'e have ing axio me second technical preparation we need is satisfaction relations for formulae of bounded complexity. Let the "complexity" of a formula be defined so that the complexity of atomic formulae is 0 and each logical operator or quantifier increases the complexity by 1. Let n be a fixed integer. Then there is a definable satisfaction relation for formulae of complexity not exceeding n. That is, there is a formula Sat with two free variables such that if 4 is a formula with free variables among X19 . . ..xk. then
is provable (in a weak set theory, say IZF without either collection or replacement). These satisfaction relations are constructed explicitly in [4, Chapter XIV].
We now assign to each term t and formula 4 of IZFR*, a corresponding term t* or formula 4" of T; * preserves the logical operations and quantifiers.
The conditions given so far suffice to determine 4* if 4 does not contain App. In addition we want ~094, r)* is AMt*, q", r*) where APP is a formula yet to be defined. We have to find a formula App satisfying the following inductive conditions, 
Theorem. ZFR is consistent.
Proof. Fix an integer n. Restricting condition (6) to formulae of complexity less than n, Conditions 9.1 can be expressed in IZF. By standard methods, we can find a formula App satisfying these conditions. It is easy to verify that every axiom of ZFR except the axiom of images is satisfied under the translation 4* (where separation is restricted to formulae of complexity less than n). The axiom
APP(f,x,Y)~APPU&2) -+ Y=z
is verified by induction on the definition of App, using clause (12); note that we have taken care that the f in various clauses have diRerent forms to prevent a conflict; in particular none of the "codes" in clauses (1) to (10) is a function, so there is no conflict with clzDuse (11). Similarly, the combinatorial axioms are satisfied because App is solution of the inductive conditions (1) to (3) . Now consider the axiom of images. Suppose Vx E a3y App(f, x, y). By collection we can find a set 11 such that Vx E a3y E v App(f, x, y). By separation we can form u = {y E o : 3x E a App(J; x, y)}. It follows from clause (10) that App((l, 7, a), a, u) and App(im *, a, (1,7, a) ), verifying the axiom of images. Cl
The reader who finds the treatment of inductive definitions in this proof somewhat sketchy will find sufficient detail in the next section, where we refine the construction to show it can be done using only replacement.
Every formula in the language of tvhid:! is provable in is
Let 4 be a formula in the language of which is a theorem of n integer large en0 that there is a der ion of 4 involving on1 of complexity less than n.
erivations, ever involving only formulae of complexity less than n of a fo ula A can be transformed into a derivation in ZF of A*. But in case A is in the language of ,A* isjust A. Cl
In the remainder of this section, we shall consider several possible extensions of 9.
verything is an integer or a nd not both. The consistency proof above actually shows the consistency of Z with the collection schema and the axiom VxS(x). Should we require the consistency of ZFR with Vx((N(x) v S(X)) A l( N(X) A S(X))), the proof may be supplemented by the methods of the exercises of [4, Chapter VIII]. The right projection can be defined as po= AZ.{ w E U(W) : Vy E uz( z = (poz, y) + w E y)}. These definitions are intuitionistically correct; some simpler definitions work classically but not intuitionistically. Hence, it was theoretically unnecessary to include constants for pairing and projection in IZFR.
9.6. Adding constants for specific set-theoretically definable operations. In this case the consistency proof will still apply; there are just more basis clauses in the inductive definition. For example, by 9.5 we could add constants w, jo, and j. with the axioms jo(nxy) = x and jo(my) = y. .7. Strong exponentiation. We might wish to assert the existence of the set op(A, B) of all operations from A to B. Note that this is not the same as the set of all functions from A to B, which can be defined using powerset and separation. Neither is it the same as the set A + B, as discussed in Section 8. To be precise, we consider the axiom 
Note that
P fygils in the model of ZFR constructed above, since even op(N, N) does not exist, in view of the fact that An.kOx (which is actually ould ilave to belong to Q (N, N) for every set x; but this is ave arbitrarily large rank, as it is interpreted in the model. We do not known i is consistent. This may seem like a drawback from the point of view of computer science since the type construction A + B is important. However, the version of exponentiation just considered is too strong. The right version of exponentiation, similar to t artin-Liif's theories, is th discussed in Section 8; and we een that this follows fro e holds in the model constructed above.
is no stronger t This section has two purposes: (1) for those readers not on intimate terms with definition by transfinite induction in set theory, it will provide complete details of our consistency proof; and (2) for those readers interested in constructive set theory, we present a refinement of the proof which shows that we can get by with only replacement, instead of collection, which was needed in the proof presented above. (The two are not constructively equivalent, as discussed in Section 7.)
The idea of the proof is to replace the definition of App by an inductive definition of a four-place relation R, where intuitively, if R(f, x, y, u), then u is the "reason" why App(J x, y). We will write down suitable conditions for the definition of R, and afterwards define App(f, x, y)-3uR(f;
x, y, u). The reason this is useful is that the definition of R is essentially by induction on E, while that of App is not. In formalizing the definition of App, we need collection to collect together the u values such that R(f, X, y, u) for x E a, in order to define im( f, a). Defining R instead permits us to get by with replacement. The last condition says that R satisfies every instance of induction on the definition of that can be expressed in e least solution of the inductive condition 1.) Note that if we restrict the complexity of 4 in (5) to be less than a fixed integer n, then conditions ( I)-( 12) can be expressed by a single formula of IZF, with an addition predicate symbol R by means of the satisfaction-definitions discussed above. We shall refer to these conditions, plus (13) for all #, as "10.1,". We shall do so by induction on the definition of R. To be precise, we will apply clause (13) of 10.1, with # taken to be #(f;x,y,u) -Vw,v(R(cf;x,w,v)+u=v~y=w). The argument proceeds by cases.
Case 1: R(f, x, y, u) because of (l)- (8) or (11) I,7,a),f,u,(g,h) ) because of (10). Suppose also R((1,7,a),f,u', (g', h')). By (13) it can be shown that u', g', h' are as in (10) as well; that is, both g and g' are functions with domain a, as are h and h', and for all x E a we have R(J; x, g(x), h(x)) and R(J x, g'(x), h'(x)). By induction hypothesis we then have g(x) = g'(x) and h(x) = h'(x) for all x E a. Hence, by extensionality, g = g' and h = h'. That completes the proof of (*).
NOW let App be defined as in the statement of the lemma. We shall prove that App satisfies Conditions 9.1,. All the conditions of 9.1 except (3) and (10) , 7, a),f, u, (g, h) ). Let A= TC ((l, 7, a),J u, (g, h) ), and let W be A-closed. We have to show { (1,7, a),_& u, (g, h) ) E w. It will suffice to show Vx E a((X x, g(x), h(x)) E w). Let x E A. men RU x, g(x), h(x)); let B = TC(f, x, g(x), h(x)). men (f, x, g(x), h(x)) belongs to every B-closed set, and by (**), W n B is B-closed; hence, U x, g(x), h(x)) E w. Now consider (13) . Suppose the formula $ satisfies (1). ( 12) The model is constructed by the same technique as ve, that is, by inductively defining an application relation. We shall have to m two modifications in the construction. The first one is obvious: we shall leave out clause (11) in 9.1, which makes every set-theoretic function an operation.
ith classical logic, that clause will lead to many nonrecursive functions. We want to construct instead the model which has only those operations that must be there on account of the axioms.
The second modification we have to make is not quite so obvious. It has to do with the representation of the integers as the "Von Neumann integers" of set theory. ZFR takes integers as primitive, and does not use the Vow Neumann representation Our first model of ZFR did model the integers as Von Neumann integers, but we shall have to abandon the Von Neumann integers to get a model with only recursive operations. Here is why.
When we ask our computation system to produce an integer, we want to get a numeral as answer, not a definition of some set like q = {x : x = 8 A P}, where P is an unsolved problem like Ferm,t y .
9 'c last themwn. One may belime-in fact, if XC takes classical logic, ene must believe-that this definition defines either zero or one, even though we do not know which.
a Gzfinition is not the kind of answer we want from the computer as an f we accept the Van Neumann integers as the definition of "integer", we will be stuck with "integers" like this one.
It is for this reason that ZF takes the integers as primitive, instead of as defined in set theory. If we accept the Von Neumann integers as the integers, then we will certainly have nonrecursive operations on the integers, for example, which defines the characteristic function of the halting problem if we use classical logic. (With only intuitionistic logic, we cannot prove that the values of fare Von Neumann integers; to do that we have to prove that f(n) is either zero or one.) Note that the definition off does not work if integers are primitive; it depends on the Von Neumann construction of integers as sets.
One will naturally wonder at this point, "but are the Von Neumann integers not isomorphic to the integers ?' The answer is that they are isomorphic by a set-theoretic function, but not necessarily by an operation. If we had an operation g that computed the integer equivalent to a given Von Neumann integer, we could solve Fermat's last theorem by applying g to the set q constructed above. Of course, this remark will only become a precise theorem about the nonexistence of an isomorphism operation after we have constructed a model with only recursive operations. But it illustrates the situation. One can use the recursion theorem to embed the integers in the Von Neumann integers:
but one cannot construct the inverse off and show it to be defined on all the Von Neumann integers.
We are suggesting a viewpoint according to which, even with classical logic, the set q defined above does not count as an integer. This viewpoint is codified in ZFR.
ds with the set-theoretic tradition, but it is the viewpoint suitable for computational mathematics, whether or not one accepts classical logic. The main theorem of this section, that there is a natural recursion-theoretic model of ZFR in which only recursive operations from N to N occur, shows that this viewpoint is coherent.
With these explanations finished, we can proceed to the constructic This construction can best be understood if we think of it in two stages. First we have to define a model of the set-theoretic part of 2 in which there will be thrre kinds of things: sets, numbers, and other objects, which are clearly labelled. Having done that, we shall then give an inductive definition of the application relation, much as we did above.
The model, which we shall call M, will be built of sets since set theory is the traditional metatheory of mathematics. It will contain only sets of the three forms (3, x), (2, x), and (1, x). That is, only ordered pairs whose first component is 0, 2, or I;, this number will tell us whether the object in question is a number, set, or other object. The exact definition of the universe of M is as follows. to denote c4a, (1,6, 't#V, a, y, , . . . , yk) to denote c4ay1 . . . yk. As in Section 9, we can cast the construction of M c veniently as a translation from IZFR* into a suitable extension by terms of F, in which the fact that M satisfies 4 will be expressed by a formula 4". We define 0" = (2, N* = (2, ((0, n): n E o}), S(t)* is S*( t*), where S* is a formula defining the sets in M. We define (t = q)* to be t* = q*.
efinition. Membership in M: (x E a)* is the formula S*(a) /\ 3b(a = (2, b) A x E b).
It will also be convenient to write x eM a for (x E a)*.
The above definitions suffice to determine #* for all formulae 4 not containing App. In addition we shall define, as in Section 9, APPO, a 4* is AM*, q*, r*)
where App is a formula yet to be defined. We have to find a formula App satisfying the following inductive conditions. 11.3. Definition. The application relation of is defined inductively by the follow-
APPW, 0,x), Y, 4;
(5) (6) f. The inductive definition can be formalized as in Section 9. We then check the axioms of ZFR are satisfied; this goes as in Section 9 except that the definition of membership in M is slightly different. Let us check, for example, the pairing axiom. Suppose M satisfies (z E pxy). That is,
~u~v(APP(P, x, 4 A APP@, Y, 27) A 2 E 4.
Then u = (1,2, x), and v = (2, {x, y}). But (z E (2, {x, y}))* is z E (x, y}. Hence, M xy) iff z=x or z=y, which is the same as (z=xvz=J)*. Then VX EM bSJ/ EM UApp(X, JJ) and also vy EM u3x EM bApp(x, y). Hence, by the de&&ion of App, we have App ((l,7, b),f, u) . Note that the set u can be formed using replacement since App is single-valued.
now check the axiom of separation. sider contains only x free. Suppose en in as (2, {x E a : d*(x)}),
where 4*(x) is the formula expressing thai R4 satisfies x E q,(a) if and only if satisfies x E a /\ 4(x).
We now check the axiom of union. Suppose (2, a) is a set in M. Th;ln ~(2, a) is interpreted in M as 2, U {x: (2, X)E a}). Thus M satisfies z E ~(2, Q) ifI ZE U b: (2,~k a) iff 3x(@, X)E a A z E X) iff 3~((2, X)E a A z Eni (2, x)). Since every set in M has the form (2, x), this is equivalent to 3 w( w E a A z EM x). This in turn Can be Written 3w( w EM (2, a) A z EM x), which is the condition mentioned in the union axiom.
The other axioms can be checked similarly. q
At this point it is instructive to see intuitively why the characteristic function of the halting problem cannot be defined in Mb Let us try defining f(n) = (0, {m : m = 0 A (n}( II)&}. That would be the object playing the role of characteristic function of the halting problem in M. But there is no operation fof M which has this behavior under the .+p relation. (That has not been proved yet, of course, but just try to construct one.)
Our next goal is to actually prove that the application relation of M has the property that it introduces only recursive operations on the integers. One obviously has to prove something by induction on the definition of the application relation, and that something has to refer to arbitrary operations in the model, and not only to operations from N to N.
The key tool in the proof is the notion of term reduction and the related notion of term models. The basic facts can be found in [4, Chapter V]. There one finds the reduction rules for the combinatory part of Z , and the definition of "inside-first reduction", which is better-known in computer science as "call-by-value" reduction; it just means that one must evaluate all subterms of the term one is evaluating, even if they are only to be thrown away.
We shall construct a combinatory algebra A from M, intuitively by identifying all the sets in M to a single object, and making the other identifications that this necessitates. It turns out to be easier to describe A directly, and then to give a homomorphism of combinatory algebras from M to A. A is constructed as follows: It is the normal-term model whose elements are closed normal terms in the language of ZFR augmented by a new constant a. The application relation in this model is defined by Ap( t, s) = RED( ts), where RED(t) is the result of reducing the term t by call-by-value term reduction, using the following reduction rules (here written as equations) : roof. The statement that it is a homomorphism also means that kM goes onto k and sM goes onto s, which is true by definition of O. We prove that it preserves aP shall prove by induction on the definition of the application relation in (x, y, z), then RED(x"y") = z", where, as above, RED is call-by-value term reduction. There are ten cases corresponding to the clauses (l)- (10) l, 0, x), y, x) . Note that ((1, 0, x) ) x0, so that what we must show is x0; but this is true since x0 and y" are normal terms. have App(s*, x, (1, 1, x) ); we have to show that A satisfies uation are equal to We must show RED ( (( 1, 1, x, y) )"z") = w". We have (( 1 , 1, x, y) )" = sx"yo; now we calculate RED(sx"y"z") = RED( RED(x"t") RED(y"z")) = RED(u"v")
by equations (1) and (2) = w", which was what we had to show. Case 4. We have App(p*, x, (1,2, x) ); we have to show that A satisfies RED(px") = (( 1,2, x))"; but both sides of this equation are equal to px". For the second part of (4), we have App((l,2, x), y, (2, {x, y})). Note that ((I, 2, x))O= px', so that what we must show is RED(px"y") = ((2, {x, y}))". The right-hand side is equal to a by definition of On The inner terms on the left-hand side, namely x0 and y", are normal; so the left-hand side is computed using the reduction rule pxy reduces to a. Case 5. We have App(u*, x, (2, w)) for a certain w (the exact value of w is given just before Definition 11.3, but does not matter); since ((2, w))" = a, what we must show is RED(ux") = a. Since x0 is normal, this follows using the reduction rule ut reduces to a.
Case 6. First assume 4 has only x free. Then we have App(c$, (2, a), (2, (w E a : 4*(w)})).
We have to show RED(q(2, a}') = (2, (w E a : t$*(w)}}O. But both sides are equal to a. Next assume that 4 has exactly x, yl,. . . , ym free. Then we have App(c$, (2, a), (1,6, '#, a) ). We must show RED(q,a) = (1,6, '#', a)? The left-hand side is equal to c+a since this term is normal (because m > 0), and the right-hand side is equal to c+a by definition of O.
Similarly, we have AppW, 6, '4', (2, a), yr) = . . v yd, ~k+~) (1,6, '46 (2, a), Yl , . *. , yk+J. We must show that RED(c4ayT,. . . ,Yok+1) = @,a),
Y19 . l l 9 Y&+*)"e
The term on the left side is normal, and by definition sf O, it is the value of the right-hand side also. We have We must show RED&, y",) = a. This follows from the fact that the subterms on the left are normal, together with one of the reduction rules.
Case 7. We have App(s& (0, n), (0, n v {n}). We must show Since n + 1 is just another name for the term sNli, this follows umerals are rqrmal terms.
Case 8. We have App(P", (2, x), (2, ((2,~): 2 E (41)).
We must show RED( pa) = a, which follows since 9 and a are normal and kZ@a reduces to Case 9. We have N(n)* + Appld*, n, (1,4, n)). Suppose N(n)*, that is, n is an integer in M Then n has the form (0, n,), and no is fiI. SO what we have to show is RED@&) = ((1,4, n>o) . Since dfi is normal, the left side is just d& . That is also the value of the right-side, by definition of O.
We have N(n)* I\ N(m)* + App ((l, 4, n), m, (1,4, n, m) ). Suppose N(n)* and N(m)*. Then n has the form (0, n,), and m has the form (0, m,) . What we have to show is RED(d&liil) = ((1,4, n, m) )'. Since the term on the left is normal, the left side is just dfi,@ . By definition of ', that is also the value of the right side.
We have N(H)* A N(m)* + App( ( 1,4, n, m), x, (1,4, n, m, x) ). Suppose, as above, that n = (0, n,) and m = (0, m,) . We have to show RED(dn',fi,x") = ((1,4, n, p?r, x) )". Since x0 is normal, the left side is just dn'lfilxo. But that is the value of the right side, by definition of O.
Suppose n = (0, n,). We have App((l,4, n, m, x), y, x). We have to show RED(Jn',n',x"yo) = x0. But that follows from the facts that x0, y", and numerals are normal terms, so the reduction rule for d applies.
Similarly, suppose n = (0, n,) and m = (0, m,). Then we have App( ( 1,4, n, m, x) , y, y). We have to show RED(dn', fi,x"y") = y". But that follows from the facts that x0, y", and numerals are normal terms, so the reduction rule for d applies. Since f O is normal, the reduction rule im(a, x) = a applies, so the left side is just a. Since u is a set in M, u" is also a. That completes the ten cases of the inductive proof. Cl Suppose f is an element of M such that satisfies Vn E N{ fn E IV). Let t y Theorem 11.7, if satisfies fii = fi, then tii reduces to fi by call-by-value n other words, f is extensionally equal to its image f ".
11.5, this function is recursive. Cl
Another interesting consequence can be drawn from the model M: it is impossible to define an operation in which will take two distinct integer values on two different sets CL and b. Before proving this fact, we first make it plausible. Suppose s and b are two sets; then define u = {x: (x E a A P) v (x E b A lP)}, where P is an unsolved problem, say Fermat's last theorem. Now suppose we have an operation f such that fa = 0 and fb = 1. Then we could settle Fermat's problem by computing fu and seeing whether it is zero or one. This kind of example is familiar in constructive mathematics, but here we have classical logic; only the operations are to be constructive.
11.9. Theorem. Proof. Let m be the value of fa in M and n the value of fb. Then f"(a) reduces to fi since O is a homomorphism and a0 = a. But since also 6" = a, f"(a) reduces to Is. By the uniqueness of normal forms, n = m. Cl
In particular, any integer-valued operations defined on P(N) mirst be constant. It is impossible to define nontrivial integer-valued operations on sets. It may seem paradoxical to propose a computation system based on set theory when such a simple function as count(x), the cardinality of a finite set x, cannot be computable. But as we have seen if count(x) were computable, then we could solve Fermat's last theorem, by applying count to a suitable set. That set is not the sort of set we will deal with often in computer science since we cannot list its elements. There are two ways of saying what kinds of sets we will deal with in computer science: either use constructive logic, in which case "finite set" has a more restrictive meaning than it does in classical logic; it means we can explicitly count the elements of the set. Another approach is to restrict attention to representations of sets, e.g., by finite lists, which are operations with domain an initial segment of N. In any case, our inability to count the number of elements of sets with complicated definitions will not be a practical limitation on the usefulness of set theory as a computation system.
emark. It is an open problem whether Church's thesis plus classical logic plus
Exp is consistent.
tion syste
We now return to the original theme of the paper, namely set theor:! as a computation system. We shall discuss the possibility of implementing as a computation system. The first step is to write the axioms of as rules of inference x E a zea rules, e.g., also be treated this way, while there is no collection axiom:
3xEa(z=fx)
.
These rules can be straightforwardly translated into PROLOG, producing a computation system that recognizes or finds proofs in IZFR. Of course, such a system could be implemented in any other programming language, too.
What would such a computation system be good for? Consider Knuth's example of an algorithm extracted from Bishop's proof of the Weierstrass approximation theorem. We could write out the formal proof of the approximation theorem, feed it to a suitable (rather simple) program, and extract the algorithm implicit in the proof. We should be able, in fact, to use the computation system to fill in the most detailed steps of the proof if we provide the major steps. In other words, we should be able to extract algorithms from proofs; such algorithms would be automatically guaranteed to satisfy their specifications.
An actual implementation would probably avoid existentially defined sets such (a, f) and work instead with a term for the graph off restricted to a; in this paper we have used im instead, in the belief it is more natural for humans. The computer, however, would have to keep track of the "witnesses" demonstrating membership in im( a, f), and it would be natural to do this explicitly. Such an implementation would probably restrict the separation axiom to formulae which are "almost-negative" in a suitable sense. This would permit the use of a simple form of q-realiz lity for the extraction of algorithms from proofs. On top of this internal system re would be a user interface which would translate certain existentially defined types into explicit, internal versions. Thus, for example, the user could define a type as a union,, and the system would construct an internal type which would also keep track of the witness of membership in the union.
We next discuss some examples of data types which are useful in computer science, as defined in such a computerized set theory.
Example 1 (Lists). The programming language ML permits the polymorphic type Q! list, where a! is any type; this is the type of lists of objects of type cy. In ZF can be defined in the most mathematically natural way: a list of length n is a function from the first n integers to the set cy, and list( a ) is the union over all integers n of the set of lists of length n of members of cy.
Example 2 (Sorting). 0ne wishes to be able to define a polymorphic sorting algorithm sort( a, R, x) which will take as arguments any set Q! with a linear order R on it, and a finite list x of elements of cy, and return the sorted list with the same elements as X, but in R-order. Here we assume that R is actually an operation that decides the order of any two elements of a! by returning 1 or 0. Several such algorithms are known and studied in elementary courses, yet many computer languages, even such advanced ones as ML, are unable to express such a polymorphic operation. Instead, you must wnte a new version of your sorting algorithm for each new type cy. (The reason is that sort(a, &R, x) is only defined when R satisfies a condition depending of (Y, and the type-formation mechanisms of ML do not allow for that.) Note that definitions of this sort are completely straightforward in ZFR.
Church's thesis and the axiom of choice
The first model constructed above contains lots of nonrecursive functions from N to N, It therefore does not correspond to any sensible operational semantics for set theory considered as a computation system. We therefore constructed the second model M, in which only recursive operations occur, even if logic is taken to be classical. If we do take classical logic, then exactly as in ordinary set theory there will be many nonrecursive functions, in the set-theoretic sense of single-valued subsets of N x N. But the natural implementation of as a computation will make use of only the intuitionistic natural-deduction rules; the law of the excluded middle is an extra appendage in this context. Such considerations lead naturally to the formal question whether can prove the existence of any nonrecursive functions. In other words, is it consistent with to assume that all functions are recursive? Note that this is stronger than " operations are recursive"; we already know that this is consistent, by the model of Section 11.
Church's thesis can be formulated in the language of as follows:
(e is a recursive index off). Note that A& can be used to prove that every that every set-theoretic function on N is extensionally equivalent to some operation. Similarly, the following axiom of "unique choice" can be used to prove that every set-theoretic function (with whatever domain) is extensionally equivalent to some operation: Wx E a3 !yA(x, y) + 3f Wx E aA(x, fx).
This axiom was first introduced by Myhill [41]
who called it an axiom of "non-choice" since if f ranges over set-theoretic functions instead of operations, it is a triviality. Both the axioms of choice just mentioned are consistent with ZFR since they hold in the model constructed in Section 9. On the other hand, they fail in the model A4 of Section 11 since they imply FO, which fails in that model since there are nonrecursive functions but only recursive operations. It is therefore of interest to prove the following theorem.
Theorem. IZFR+ CT+ A& + AC! is consistent,
Proof. AC! is a consequence of FO, so it suffices to prove that IZFR+ FO + ACN is consistent. Suppose it is inconsistent. Then some finite conjunction B of instances of A& can be refuted in IZFR + FO. Note that using FO, the operation mentioned in AC.. can be replaced by a function, so that the formula B can be assumed to be a formula of IZF, i.e., not mentioning The ideas of constructive mathematics and computer science prompt a reexamination of the concepts of "set" and "class". In this appendix, we shall recall the ideas of Cantor, Dedekind and Frege, and compare them with those of Brouwer and Bishop, and with the "data types" of computer science, as explained by Martin-Eiif and as used in modern programming languages.
What is a set?
Cantor addressed this fundamental question at the beginning of his seminal memoir (1895) on set theory:
A set is a collection into a whole of definite, distinct objects of our intuition or thought. 4 Cantor was well aware that there are certain "inconsistent sets", as he called them, which he regarded as "multiplicities" that could not be collected into "unities". Thus the phrase "'into a whole" was vital.
Another person who was influential in the development of set theory was Dedekind, who used set theory to give a foundation to arithmetic in his essay, Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen. Here is his definition of a set (for whi& he used the word "system"):
If different things a, b, c, . . . for some reason can be considered from a certain p int of view, can be associated in the mind, we say they form a system S.. . Such a system (an aggregate, a manifold, a totality) as an object of our thought is likewise a thing; it is completely determined when with respect to everything it is determined whether it is an element of S or not.5
This definition, which nicely rules out the set occurring in Russell's paradox, preceded Russell's discovery of that paradox by more than two decades. In both Cantor's and Dedekind's definitions, there is an element of "mental collection" which must be present in order that elements constitute a set. Nevertheless, it seems to have been the intention of both that a set was determined by its elements. The very next sentence in Dedekind's book makes this explicit, by formulating what is now known as the axiom of extensionality:
The system S is hence the same as the system T, in symbols S = T, when every element of S is also an element of T, and every element of T is also an element of S. Frege goes on to the example of the empty set, making the point that if it is the elements that determine a set, then it is hard to see how a set with no elements can be determined! Instead, he points out, the empty set is the set of all things falling under a concept which is always false! The intuitive appeal of this theory of concepts and classes was such that Frege was convinced of its value. He wrote [17, p. 1471:
Independently of Dedekind and
It is improbable that such an edifice could be erected on an unsound base. Those who have other convictions have only to try to erect a similar construction upon them, and they will soon be convinced that it is not possible, or at least it is not easy. As a proof of the contrary, I can only admit the production by some one of an actual demonstration that upon other fundamental convictions a better and more durable edifice can be erected, or the demonstration by some one that my premises lead to manifestly false conclusions. But nobody will be able to do that. Cantors original definition of a set.. . therefore certainly requires some restriction; it has not, however, been successfully replaced by one that is just as simple and does not give rise to such reservaticnzrs. Under these circumstances there is at this point nothing left for us to do but to proceed in the opposite direct;on, and, Ftarting from set theory as it is historically given, to seek out the principles required for establishing the foundations of this mathematical discipline. In solving the problem we must, on the one hand, restrict these principles sufficiently to exclude all contradictions and, on the other, take them sufficiently wide to retain all that is valuable in this theory. This ad hoc procedure, which after initial controversies became the dominant view of the mathematical community, and remains so to this day, is philosophically unsatisfying. Not everyone followed this path; in particular Whitehead and Russell attempted to repair Frege's logical foundations by introducing the theory of types in Principia Mathematics.'
Both Russell-Whitehead and Zermelo gave formal systems which avoided the paradoxes while allowing ordinary mathematics, but their motivations differed: Zermelo looked to history and practice for his axioms, Russell and Whitehead looked for intuitively correct logical notions. At that time, the theory of classes was often viewed as logical in nature; even Cantor had considered such a deep mathematical proposition as the well-ordering theorem as a "law of thought". So it is not surprising that the paradoxes gave rise to a reexamination of the laws of logic. Such a "beginning again at the beginning" was undertaken by Brouwer! In 1918, in 6 The empty set is nowhere to be found in Cantor, and is specifically eschewed by r,dekind for "certain reasons" which are left unspecified. So perhaps they were aware of this difficulty! 7 The closeness of viewpoint in Prineipiu and in Frege can be seen for example in Principiu *20: "The characteristics of a class are that it consists of all the terms satisfying some propositional function, so that every pralpositional function determines a class, and two functions which are formally equivalent (i.e., such that whenever one is true, the other is true also) determine the same class, while conversel) two functions which determine the same class are formally equivalent."
8 It is worth noting that merely rejecting the law of the excluded middle does not stop Russell's paradox, which can be carried out with intaitionistic logic. Frege seems to have been confused about this [17, p. 3251.
Begriindung der Mengenlehre unabhiingig vom log&hen Satz vom ausgeschlossenen
Dritten (Foundations of set theory independent of the logical theorem of the excluded middle) [7] , Brouwer addresses the problem of defining the fundamental notion of "set". According to Brouwer, the natural numbers and the linear continuum are known to us by intuition; thus natural numbers and real numbers (given by what later came to be called "choice sequences") will be the elements of the most fundamental kind of set. Brouwer defined a set ("Menge") or spread to be (ignoring some minor technicalities) a rule associating a number to each sequence of natural numbers. "Eine Menge ist ein Gesetz . . . "; a set is a rule. More generally, Brouwer recognized the notion of a "species of first order", whose members could be only numbers or spreads, ani which had to be defined by a property. Quite possibly influenced by 'Whitehead and Russell's theory of types, he went on to recognize "species of second order" whose elements could be species of first order, and so on.
Brouwer's approach was felt to be too radical by many mathematicians. For example, Von Neumann (1925) 1381, in introducing a new axiomatization of set theory, is at pains to separate his and Zermelo's approach from that of Brouwer, which is "not a rehabilitation of set theory at all, but rather a very sharp critique of the modes of inference hitherto used in elementary logic. . . [Brouwer] systematically rejects the larger part of mathematics and set theory as completely meaningless." That this was, for Von Neumann, enough to vitiate the entire approach can be seen from these remarks:
There will be no attempt to make derivations unobjectionable Aso in the sense of the intuitionism of Brouwer and Weyl. I would like to remark, nevertheless, that this, too, could be attained rather easily (through a few insignficant modifications); but I forgo this as a matter of principle, since the axiomatic method is in itself contrary to the essence of intuitionism. [26, p. 3961.
Constructive axiomatic set theory thus missed a chance of being born in 1925; it had to wait almost half a century more. Brouwer's intuitionistic set theory gained few followers, no doubt because of its wholesale rejection of classical concepts and methods. So far as the author is aware, nobody tried again to define the concept of "set" until Bishop (1967) [5] . There one finds the following definition (p.
13):
The totality of all mathematical objects constructed in accordance with certain requirements if called a set.
The word "requirements" reminds one of Frege's "concepts"; but note the explicit provision that the elements must be constructed. The word "totality" reminds one of Cantor and Dedekind (in fact, it was given as a synonym for "system" by Dedekind); but the subjective nature of the process of "collecting" into a totality, which Frege criticized, is not present in Bishop's definition. Bishop seems to have believed, or at least hoped, that he had done what Zermelo mentions above as not having been done: to successfully replace Cantor's definition of set by one just as simple which does not give rise to paradoxes. In unpublished work, Bishop gave a quite attractive axiomatic theory in which his book could be formalized; but, unfortunately, like Frege's, it was inconsistent. (Presumably he was aware of the fact, which was why he did not publish his theory.)g Bishop's explanation of "set", however, is not at all what is taught in mathematics courses in graduate school. If the question of the nature of sets is taken up at all, the explanation offered is the "cumulative hierarchy" of sets. One starts with the empty set (or some individuals) and repeatedly collects the subsets of what one has so far:
It is said that this is the "intend del" of the axioms of set theory. ft is interesting that this "standard model" wa iscussed at the time when ZF was created. The axiom of foundation was adde in 1928 by Von Neumann, who also introduced the cumulative hierarchy (alt at was presaged by Mirimanoff in 1917 [35] ). ZF was not about any specific ion of set, such as the well-founded sets, when it was first given; it was only ho that the paradoxes would be avoided. We thus have (at least) two inct ideas of "set": the Fregean notion of a set as an extension of a property, which is intuitively appealing but inconsistent, and the notion of well-founded set, which is de$ned in terms of the (presumably) more primitive notions of iteration and collection of subsets. Whether we adopt a constructive philosophy or not seems to make little difference: the cumulative hierarchy can be treated, at least formally, with intuitionistic logic (Friedman [ 18] ), and in spite of hopes to the contrary, constructive set theory does no better at avoiding the paradoxes than classical set theory."
What is a type?
By a "type" we mean what a computer scientist means by "data type". These tell "what kind of an object" a given piece of data represents. In modem structured languages like Pascal, a program begins with "type declarations" in which certain variable names (identifiers) are reserved to name objects of the declared types. The history of the development of programming languages shows the continual search for more flexible and general type RTRAN had only two types: real and integer. Pascal allows more general typeng operations, but still does not have a type A + B of operations from the typ to the type l3. In the future, languages will be created which are adequate both to the needs of programmers and to the expression of mathematics. A pioneering effort in this direction was the AUTOMATH project (see, e.g., [6]); some others have been surveyed in Section 4.
' For completeness one should note that Bishop felt that every set should be equipped with a relation of equality, and that one has not completely defined a set until one has also defined its equality relation. Although this is not part of the "definition" quoted, it occurs two sentences further on.
lo Some may argue that Bishop's definition constitutes a third "distinct idea" since it cannot easily be equated with either Frege's notion or with Von Neumann%. Whether or not we so count it will not be essential to what follows.
By "data" we understand concrete objects which can be directly and completely represented in the computer; for example, strings of symbols. Data are to be contrasted with the abstract objects of mathematics, for example, infinite sets, which can be only indirectly represented in the computer, for example, by a program which decides membership in the set, or a string of symbols which defines the set in some language.
As we shall use the terms, the difference between a type and 8 ,et is this: a type may have only concrete objects as its members, while a set may have concrete or abstract objects as its members. In particular, a type is itself not a concrete object (unless it is a finite type). In computer science, the i&a of a hierarchy of types does not arise. One specifies types by specifying what objects "have that type", i.e., are members of the type. That is, types are typically defined in Fregean terms as extensions of a concept.
Martin-L6f [33, 34] These type theories, as published, permit the creation of a hierarchy of types; there is a "small universe" U containing the basic types, and closed under the type-forming operations; U is itself a type. So the principle that types cannct be objects is violated. In unpublished lectures (but the formalism appears in Smith [42] ), Martin-Liif rectifies this situation by emphasizing that only names of types can be objects. He introduces names for all the small types and makes these the elements of U. Martin-Liif gives an explanation of what he means by a "type"; his formal theories are supposed to reflect this informal notion. According to Martin-Liif, in order to specify a type X, you must tell (i) what the canonical objects of type X are (ii) when two canonical objects of type X are equal, and (iii) how to reduce an arbitrary object of type X to canonical form. For example, the canonical members of the type of integers are given by: 0 is a canonical element, and if n is a canonical element, so is sNn. Whenever we introduce an operation on the integers, such as addition or multiplication, we have to give the corresponding rules for evaluating expressions involving that operation. Thus 10" is an integer, because there are rules for evaluating that expression.
Let us compare Martin-Liif's types with Bishops sets. According to Bishop, we have given a set X as soon as we have told what to do to construct an element of X, and when two elements of X are equal. To turn X into one of Martin-LSf's types, -we still have to tell what the canonical elements are and how to reduce arbitrary elements to canonical form.* * Thus, for example, the set of all sets would appear to qualify as a Bishop set since he has just told us what to do to construct Feferman [ 14, 15] introduces theories of operations and "classes" which are intended to express (and be obviously valid on) a philosophy according to which mathematical o ects are given by symbolic representations (i.e., data). His formalism permits classes to be objects, but it is easy to modify the formalism (see [3] ) to permit only nmm of classes to be objects, without affecting any important properties of the system. In particular, the key axiom of Feferman's systems is the "elementay comprehension axiom", according to which we are allowed to form the class \X : 4(x)} for certain 4. One thereby has the existence of a '"universe" K The 4 which are allowed are called "elementary"; they are distinguished by the syntactic property that class variables occur only free (as parameters) and on the right of E in 4. This corresponds to the idea that types can be mentioned while defining new types only if they have been previously defined (so they can be substituted for the free class parameters in 4). Allowing them only on the right of E corresponds to the idea that they are not allowed to be objects themselves. ne &,tssell paradox is then neatly avoided since XE x is net an elementary formula.
Graves [22] is developing a computation system based on category theory (more precisely, on topos theory). He considers the category whose objects are data types; the arrows of the category are procedures leading from inputs of the domain type to outputs of the codomain type. One object, the terminal object of the category, is the type ONE. ON. is thought of as the type of "environments", i.e., maps which give values to variables. A data object is an arrow of type ONE + X. We would usually call this an object of type X. For instance, 5 is the map of type ONE + N with constant value 5. The computations in his system consist in the reductions or evaluations of terms in topos theory (enriched by a suitable collection of function symbols). Graves' work shows how topos theory can be used as a foundation for the theory of data structures and algorithms, although it was originally developed as an alternate foundation for mathematics.
One may ask: from the philosophical point of view, what does topos theory contribute to our understanding of the fundamental notion of data type? One answer is, it provides an operational semantics. A notion of data type is sound if the topos-theoretic formalism can define it; or perhaps, if a natural extension of the formalism can define it. Graves has shown that all the usual data types can be naturally defined in topos theory, which of course goes far beyond Pascal in its generality of type formation.'3 I2 Greenleaf [23, pp. 2242253, argues against this, on the grounds that the set of all sets does not qualify as a Bishop set until we have constructed an equality relation on it, which he thinks is not so easy.
l3 There is, however, a technical problem suggested by this definition of soundness which is presently still open: how can we interpret Martin-Liif's type-construction operations in topos theory?
Classes
The word "set" can be used to refer either to a Fregean set, defined by the extension of a property, or to a well-founded set, i.e., one occurring in the cumulative hierarchy of sets. The word "class" refers to the extension of a property. If a class happens to be a well-founded set, then it is usually referred to as a set. Thus the word "class" is sometimes thought to be synonymous with "proper class", which refers to a class which is not in the cumulative hierarchy, such as the class of all well-founded sets or the class of all ordinals.
In the history of set theory, proper classes go back to Cantor, who recognized that certain "multiplicities" cannot be collected into a "unity". He referred to such multiplicities as "inconsistent sets". It seems to have been Von Neumann 1381 who first contemplated the consistent use of proper classes, though his theory is formulated in terms of functions rather than sets and classes. Later formulations, more familiar today, were given by Bernays and finally by G6del [43] . All these theories regard classes as being just like sets except that they are, in Von Neumann's picturesque terminology, '"too big". That is, "too big" to be a member of another class. In particular, they are viewed as abstract objects like sets, obeying the law of extensionality: two classes are equal if and only if they have the same members.
This viewpoint is not philosophically sound. If a class is "too big" to be a set, that means it cannot be collected into a unity as an abstract object. The process of abstraction that leads to a set from a symbolic representation breaks down oft certain symbolic representations. A class is given to us by a symbolic representation, but it has no extension. Frege's "second-level function" of abstraction that leads from properties to their extensions is not everywhere defined. (See [ 17, p. 2391 for Frege's analysis of Russell's paradox in exactly these terms.) A class, then, is a concrete object, not an abstract one. It is the extension of a class which is "too big" to exist; or rather, would be too big if it did exist.
It follows that there is no justification for the principle of extensionality for classes, in spite of its formal consistency. Nor should we identify a class with the set, if it exists, which has the same members: one is a concrete object, the other is an abstraction.
The way in which data types are used in computer science casts some light on the situation. A type can be used in two different ways:
(i) as a classif'ier, for classifying objects according to what type they are, or (ii) as a data structure, i.e., an object, in its own right, which can be manipulated like any other piece of data.
Data types as classifiers are like sets; data types as structures are like classes= Since this is rather a revolutionary view of the matter, perhaps we had better put it the other way around: sets are like data types as classifiers, while classes are like data types as structures.
Some support for this view comes, quite independently of the ideas that led to it, from the work of Peter Aczel. Aczel has been trying to use set theory to describe certain data structures used in computer science, for example streams. A stream is a (theoretically) infinite object, for example the stream of characters being printed on a terminal. Aczel [l] found that the well-founded sets are inadequate for this purpose, while the non-well-founded sets that he invented for the purpose (or should we say "discovered"?) worked marvelously. These non-well-founded sets are beautifully described by their merzbership diagrams, which are certain graphs. These non-sets, in the traditional view, would have to be called classes; but they do not even fit the usual view of classes as collections of well-founded sets. What are they? Structures which are used to describe classifiers.
In this view, a proper Jass is simply a class whose structure is too rich to permit it to be abstracted away, leaving only an extensional shell. The question of its being "tad big" is not relevant; size is only oae aspect of structure, and not always the most important. Of course, it may be that certain classes are "too big" to be sets; but the assumption that excessive size is the only reason why the abstraction operation might be undefined appears to be completely unjustified.
Hallett 1251 has written a book which explores the history of the "limitation of size hypothesis", according to which every "incon,sistent set" is inconsistent because it is "too big", i.e., contains a copy of the ordinals. He attributes this definition of "too big" to Jourdain, and the hypothesis itself to Russell [25, p. 1831 , although precursors of the idea are to be found in Cantor.
Once this misconception has been identified, one can see that it has pervaded the traditional interpretation of certain mathematical results. For example, Cantor's diagonal method shows that if we are given a sequence of real numbers 3c,, we can construct another real number which is different from all the x,. Does that mean that the set of real numbers is larger than the set of integers? That is the usual interpretation placed on the result. But it might be interpreted to mean instead that the set of reals has a very rich structure, which does not permit it to be covered by the integers.14 This point of view finds some support from the fact that in constructive mathematics, for all we know every real number is recursive-and in that case, the reals would be in one-one correspondence with a subset of the integers (their recursive indices). They still could not be placed in recursive one-one correspondence with the integers, however, so Cantor's theorem would not be violated. How do we know that the actual situation is not better described in these terms, than in terms of size?
The theory formulated in the body of this paper, without the apparently artificial restriction that the formula in the separation axiom must not mention the application relation, is inconsistent. The contradiction appears to show that if we do not limit the axioms, the application relation, even restricted to sets of a fixed rank, cannot be a set. It is thus an example of a proper class which is not a set because of a structural complexity other than its size. Since the main piece of evidence for the "limitation of size hypothesis" seem to be Russell's observation that all the contradicl4 Sez [23, p. 2301. tory classes are "too big", we now have a specific reason for reconsidering that hypothesis.
Classes may have a more complex structure than can be summed up by telling what size they are. If we abstract away everything but the membership structure, we get sets. Operations have a more complex structure than their input-output relation, which is usually called the "graph". If we abstract that structure away, we get the usual set-theoretic representation. These abstractions have served matheImatics well, but they may not be ideal for the foundations of computer science, and they may have led to mistakes in the foundations of mathematics.
